Tag Archives: CIA

Our new Forbes Piece: 1962, The U2, and You: A Risk Management Lesson from the Cold War

Our new Forbes piece shows that by looking at the origins of the Cuban Missile Crisis, one can learn valuable lessons on Risk management. Read it here.

Two Short but Excellent Books on Intelligence

In the midst of so many “breaking” geopolitical events, I wanted to take a moment to recommend two recently-published books on Intelligence.  Both are quick reads, and neither seems to be getting the sort of attention I think they deserve.

The first book deals with the recent past, and is called The Snowden Operation: Inside the West’s Greatest Intelligence Disaster.  The author is Edward Lucas, who as a senior editor at the Economist brings thirty years’ of experience in Russian and European affairs to bear on what Snowden did and how the Affair as a whole should be approached.  Just seventy-six pages long, it’s a “Kindle Short”, so it will set you back about one US dollar.  Stop talking about Snowden, the NSA, privacy, and civil liberties until you have read it.

Stop talking about Snowden until you read this

Stop talking about Snowden until you read this.

My other recommendation is only ninety-eight pages long, and deals with the relatively distant past.  It’s James Jesus Angleton:  Was He Right? , by the famous journalist and author Edward Jay Epstein.  Angleton, of course, was the now much-ridiculed head of CIA counterintelligence from 1954 until 1975.  To Angleton’s foes (and as portrayed in a much recent fiction), he was the CIA’s secret Captain Ahab, paralyzing the Agency in pursuit of his own Great White Whale, non-existent Soviet moles.  I recommend that you read Epstein’s little book and judge for yourself if that thought-cliché is fair, illuminating or useful.    You may find yourself wondering if you understand as much as you think you do about the Cold War.  That doubt, in turn, may make you view the present with different eyes.

Are you SURE?

Are you SURE you know what you know?

If you want to go deeper into the possibilities that Epstein raises, I recommend a book by the recently departed Tennet H. Bagley:   Spy Wars: Moles, Mysteries, and Deadly Games.

I would welcome your comments on any volume mentioned here (or anywhere else on this blog).

If you enjoyed this blog post, why not subscribe?

 

Constructing Cassandra Now Available

Our new book on strategic surprise, Constructing Cassandra:  Reframing Intelligence Failure at the CIA, 1947-2001, is now available for pre-order worldwide.

CC

Interested readers in North America can read reviews and order it via  Amazon.com or Barnes&Nobel;  in the UK you can use Amazon.co.uk; in the rest of the EU, you may wish to use Amazon.fr or Amazon.de; and in Asia you may wish to use  Amazon.jp.

If you do order it thank you.  Naturally, if you have any questions about the book, please ask us.

Meet us next week at SCIP in Orlando to talk about intelligence failure

We will be presenting our upcoming book, “Constructing Cassandra: Reframing intelligence failure at the CIA, 1947-2001” at the 28th Annual Strategic and Competitive Intelligence Professionals (SCIP) International Conference & Exhibition in Orlando (FL), USA. The conference runs from May 6th to 9th.

Continue reading

Is Your Company Heading For a Cuban Missile Crisis? Steps to Make Sure Big Data is Working For You, Not Against You

Big data evidence hiding in plain sight

The rise of big data – the ability to gather massive amounts of information about both environment and operations – rests on the assumption that having more data gives organizations better control and the ability to avoid nasty surprises. It doesn’t. To understand why, consider the Cuba missile crisis that started exactly 50 years ago today.

Read more on our latest Forbes piece here.

For regular updates, why not subscribe to our blog?

Geopolitics and Investing: A Reading List

As I explain to my students at IE, the most any business school can hope to do is move you from unconscious ignorance to conscious ignorance of a subject.  In other words, a course can lay a firm foundation in a subject, and then provide a jumping off point for future self-study.  After my MIAF course “Geopolitics and Investing”, that usually prompts the question, “Where should I begin such self-study?”  How do I start to learn to generate “geopolitical alpha”?

As I said in an earlier post, there are certain key books that point you towards how to think like an intelligence analyst.  Because the skills of an intelligence analyst and a geopolitical investor overlap so much, I would also say that investors interested in geopolitics start with those key books.  In particular, if you haven’t mastered the critical thinking and the basic analytic  techniques described in Thinking in Time, Essence of Decision and The Thinker’s Toolkit, you are still in kindergarten as far as intelligence analysis is concerned.    Heuer’s Psychology of Intelligence Analysis (downloadable free from the CIA’s site here) is also immensely valuable.  None of these books will teach you geopolitical analysis per se, but they will give you a solid foundation in non-quantitative analysis.

One investor gets a grip on Geopolitics

Continue reading

Lack of diversity paralyzed the CIA. It can cripple your organization, too

Read our guest post on Forbes here.

The most recent Forbes piece is about the coming demise of Microsoft. Read it here.

Conference on strategic surprises at the CIA

On Wednesday, January 18th, I will be giving a conference on the topic of strategic surprise at EMLYON Business School, as part of the series “The Art of Management”.  In this context, a strategic surprise is defined as the sudden realization by an organization that it has operated on the basis of an erroneous threat assessment resulting in an inability to anticipate a serious threat to its vital interests.

While the majority of the research explains strategic surprises (such as September 11) with psychological, bureaucratic or cybernetic (absence of detection of weak signals for example) models, an in-depth research on more than 50 years of the CIA’s history shows that the origin of strategic surprises often lies with the characteristics of identity and culture of the organization.  This research was started by Milo a few years ago, and we now pursue it together.  We show how the CIA was the victim of several strategic surprises, and that these surprises are largely explained by the social construction of the organization: whom it recruits, how it trains agents and analysts, how it develops its culture, etc.  In essence, what an organization is surprised by depends on its identity. After presenting the finding about the CIA, we will discuss what lessons can be drawn from these results for businesses, particularly in the field of innovation and strategy.  We will make the case that here too, the difficulties are often cultural, and results can be improved using this mode of analysis.

If you are interested in the conference, please contact us.

“Facts” Everybody Knows – Statistical Cautions about the BRICs (in honor of Igor Birman)

In business and finance, statistics and quantitative comparisons are daily companions.  Sometimes, however, key statistics can become too familiar, and reify, i.e. harden into “facts” that everybody knows.  In so doing, they play a large part in strategic surprises.

In the late 1980s, for example, the US Intelligence Community “knew” that Soviet GDP was $2.5 trillion, i.e. about 52 percent of the US GDP of $4.8 trillion.  How?  Their computer models told them so.  These models relied upon – among other things – assumptions about ruble-dollar Purchasing Power Parity (PPP).

Western academic Sovietologists also “knew” the USSR’s economy was about $2.5 trillion.  How?  Mostly, they relied on an authoritative source:  the CIA.

Continue reading

How to Think like an Intelligence Analyst

To follow up on Philippe’s post about Thinking in Time:  at IE I teach a course called “Geopolitics” to Masters in Advanced Finance students, and “The Multinational Firm and Geostrategy” to Masters in Management students.  Students in those classes sometimes ask me to recommend books to help them “think like an intelligence analyst” and apply intelligence methods to analyzing business decisions.

I provide extensive bibliographies as part of my course syllabi, but often students want me to boil my recommendations down to a few key texts.  Call it a “getting started in intelligence for businesspeople” reading list.

Continue reading