Tag Archives: strategic surprise

Meet us next week at SCIP in Orlando to talk about intelligence failure

We will be presenting our upcoming book, “Constructing Cassandra: Reframing intelligence failure at the CIA, 1947-2001” at the 28th Annual Strategic and Competitive Intelligence Professionals (SCIP) International Conference & Exhibition in Orlando (FL), USA. The conference runs from May 6th to 9th.

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Our new Forbes piece: Play it Like Steve Jobs-Three Questions for Business Leaders to Ask When Surprise Hits

Our latest post on Forbes proposes a simple framework for leaders to apply when confronted with a strategic surprise-That 3am call… In short, don’t rush into action, no matter how urgent things seem to be! Read the post here.

Previous Forbes pieces:

Is Your Company Heading For a Cuban Missile Crisis? Steps to Make Sure Big Data is Working For You, Not Against You

Big data evidence hiding in plain sight

The rise of big data – the ability to gather massive amounts of information about both environment and operations – rests on the assumption that having more data gives organizations better control and the ability to avoid nasty surprises. It doesn’t. To understand why, consider the Cuba missile crisis that started exactly 50 years ago today.

Read more on our latest Forbes piece here.

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Our Latest Forbes Piece: What a Caveman Can Teach You About Strategy

I have a strategy lesson for you

Read our latest piece on Forbes here.

In it, we argue that how an organization perceives competition or reacts to a disruption in its environment depends on its identity. Hence, before you start trying to understand them, try to understand yourself first.

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Lack of diversity paralyzed the CIA. It can cripple your organization, too

Read our guest post on Forbes here.

The most recent Forbes piece is about the coming demise of Microsoft. Read it here.

Competitive intelligence and strategic surprises: Why monitoring weak signals is not the right approach

The difficulty of anticipating strategic surprises is often ascribed to a ‘signal-to-noise’ problem, i.e. to the inability to pick up so-called ‘weak signals’ that foretell such surprises.  In fact, monitoring of weak signals has become a staple of competitive intelligence.  This is all the more so since the development of information technology that allows the accumulation and quasi-automatic processing of massive amount of data.  The idea is that the identification of weak signals will enable an organization to detect a problem (or an opportunity) early and, hence, to react more quickly and more appropriately.  For instance, a firm can detect a change in attitude of consumer behavior by spending time with the most advanced of them, as Nokia did in the early 1990s, a move that enabled the firm to realize that the mobile phone was becoming a fashion item.

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Managing the unexpected – On the work of Karl E. Weick and Kathleen M. Sutcliffe

Karl Weick has long been known for his work on organization theory.  In particular, his work focuses on how organizations make sense of complex and uncertain environments.  Among Weick’s most famous works is the study of the fire in Mann Gulch, an initially banal forest fire in 1949 that went wrong and resulted in the deaths of 13 firefighters. Weick’s analysis shows that in such conditions,  a professional team faces what he calls a ‘cosmological event’, ie an event so unexpected and powerful that it destroys the will and the ability of the victims to act, in particular to act as a group.  It is a great piece of scholarship.

“Managing the Unexpected” explores how the organization can handle the unexpected.  To do so, Weick and Sutcliffe chose to study organizations that are specifically created with that end in mind, which they call High-Reliability Organizations (HRO):  firefighters, crew of a submarine, the control center of a nuclear plant, etc. What principles do these organizations implement to operate?

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Conference on strategic surprises at the CIA

On Wednesday, January 18th, I will be giving a conference on the topic of strategic surprise at EMLYON Business School, as part of the series “The Art of Management”.  In this context, a strategic surprise is defined as the sudden realization by an organization that it has operated on the basis of an erroneous threat assessment resulting in an inability to anticipate a serious threat to its vital interests.

While the majority of the research explains strategic surprises (such as September 11) with psychological, bureaucratic or cybernetic (absence of detection of weak signals for example) models, an in-depth research on more than 50 years of the CIA’s history shows that the origin of strategic surprises often lies with the characteristics of identity and culture of the organization.  This research was started by Milo a few years ago, and we now pursue it together.  We show how the CIA was the victim of several strategic surprises, and that these surprises are largely explained by the social construction of the organization: whom it recruits, how it trains agents and analysts, how it develops its culture, etc.  In essence, what an organization is surprised by depends on its identity. After presenting the finding about the CIA, we will discuss what lessons can be drawn from these results for businesses, particularly in the field of innovation and strategy.  We will make the case that here too, the difficulties are often cultural, and results can be improved using this mode of analysis.

If you are interested in the conference, please contact us.

The Fragility of the Future (and Your Strategy)

Today I was reminded of the perils of forecasting while reviewing  a Department of Defense document, the Joint Operating Environment 2010.

“JOE 2010” as it’s called, is designed to provide the various branches of the US Armed Forces a joint perspective on likely global trends, possible shocks and their future operating environment.  If you’re interested in geopolitics and strategy, I recommend that you take a look.

Apart from its inherent interest, JOE 2010 opens with a defense planning timeline that business and financial strategy practitioners – and anyone who consumes their work  – would do well to bear in mind.  I have reproduced it verbatim here:

1900 If you are a strategic analyst for the world’s leading power, you are British, looking warily at Britain’s Age-old enemy, France.

1910 You are now allied with France, and the enemy is now Germany.

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Gresham’s Law of Strategy: Why Bad Advice Drives out Good Advice

Near the end of a seminal essay on strategic surprise, Richard Betts writes, “The intelligence officer may perform most usefully by not offering the answers sought by authorities, but by offering questions, acting as a Socratic agnostic, nagging decision makers into awareness of the full range of uncertainty, and making authorities’ calculations harder rather than easier.”  I believe that the same should be true for corporate strategy consultants:  often their job is to make long-range calculations harder rather than easier.

Why then, is the opposite so often true?  In a world in which surprise, disruption and the unanticipated are rife, why do strategists who promise to make calculations easier rather than harder often succeed?  I think a phenomenon that I call of “Gresham’s Law of Strategic Advice” is at work.

E pluribus unum

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